Review of Financial Reporting: An Accounting Revolution by William Beaver

I personally benefit from Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 of this book. Chapter 2 has a good summary of responses to information asymmetry and agency problems including adverse selection and moral hazard. For information asymmetry between more informed investors and less informed investors, less informed investors can do three things to protect themselves: long-term buy and hold passive trading strategy; infer information from informed investors' trading; use information intermediaries.  Consequences of adverse selection include four aspects: holders of higher quality securities might be forced to hold a large share of those securities; holders of higher quality securities might signal; certification, insurance or warranties; no trading at all. Two responses to the moral hazard problem are available: to provide an incentive contract to management; to force public disclosure or monitor.
Chapter 5 talks about research on the usefulness of other financial statement data than the earnings number, which I think is very interesting. Will find these research out and read them someday soon.